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paper takes an alternative approach that effectively achieves the same outcome but retains deductibility of interest expense: by including non-equity financial transactions in the calculation of taxable income, the new tax treatment of debt-taxable when borrowed but deductible when repaid-would mirror the symmetric tax treatment of equity-non-taxable when issued and not deductible when dividends are
hifting from depreciation deductions to immediate expensing typically will reduce the tax base; this will be true whenever investment exceeds depreciation, which is typical for a growing economy and true in each of [the last] five years. On the other hand, net financial investment for this sector is typically negative, because the nonfinancial sector is a net debtor to the rest of the economy, and growing companies typically increase their liabilities over time. Thus, these changes in the tax base typically offset each other". 8 This may be true for the past years studied by Auerbach, but will it still be true if behavioral responses to his proposal are taken into account?
In general, it seems to me that excluding the normal return to investment from income is bound over time to reduce the corporate tax base, because it converts the corporate tax from an income to a consumption tax. In that way, the Auerbach proposal is no different from its predecessors the Flat Tax, the X Tax, and the GIT. They all make the US into the world's biggest tax haven by enacting a zero rate for normal returns on corporate investment. Whether this is an improvement depends on the international aspects of the proposal, and we turn to those next. With investments facing a zero rate of corporate tax in the United States, they will be taxed less heavily than in countries that impose positive tax rates, even low ones, on corporate income. Thus, as in the case of profit-shifting activities, the pressure of international tax competition will no longer be a relevant consideration in setting the U.S. corporate tax rate." 10 But will this in fact be the case? I believe the answer is no, for three reasons. First, as argued above, to the extent the proposal depends on increasing corporate tax rates by disallowing the interest deduction, there would still be an incentive for US corporations (especially financial ones) to move their operations to tax havens where there is no income tax at all.
Second, like any cash flow tax, the Auerbach proposal still taxes rents. As is well known, allowing a current deduction for capital expenditures only exempts the normal or marginal return from tax. Rents or infra-marginal returns are still subject to corporate tax at 35%. Auerbach acknowledges this, but seems to assume that such rents are country-specific and therefore not shiftable out of the US:
"Because corporations generate additional earnings, called rents, through production, there would still be a corporate tax base. But the taxation of rents and break-even returns to capital have different effects on behavior and, as a consequence, on the incidence of the corporate tax burden. While taxing the normal returns required to meet the cost of capital discourages investment and, especially in an open economy, may cause a shift in some of the corporate tax burden from capital to labor because of the resulting decline in worker productivity, taxing rents is less likely to do so, particularly if these rents are not easily shifted from the United States."
The problem, however, is that the literature on multinationals shows that while they do typically earn rents, these rents typically are the result of ownership of intellectual property or other types of internal ownership advantages that are not specific to any given location. 12 In fact, it is precisely the profit from such rents that is the subject of shifting in transfer pricing practice. Since the US would still tax these rents at 35%, one would expect them to be shifted. But shifting in a purely territorial system with no Subpart F and presumably weak transfer pricing enforcement is much easier than it is under current law.
Finally, Auerbach ignores the likely reaction of other countries to the US adopting his proposal. But if the US becomes the world's biggest tax haven, other countries are likely to respond by putting it on their "black list" and applying CFC rules and transfer pricing to tax the income that would be shifted into the US. This might negate the anticipated beneficial effect on inbound FDI.
In addition, adopting the Auerbach proposal would create a significant risk of double taxation. The reason is that other countries may consider the US corporate tax not to be an income tax and therefore not eligible for credit or exemption under domestic law or tax treaties. They would argue that by allowing deductibility of capital expenditures, the tax effectively becomes a consumption tax. That was in fact the reason the US ruled that such a cash flow tax was not creditable when it was proposed for adoption elsewhere. This would not be an issue if the US corporate tax rate were zero, although it would mean that the US might lose the purported advantage of the zero rate because the same income would be taxed by another country. But to the extent the US still taxes rents, the same rents could be subject to double taxation, which would create further incentive to shift them out of the US.
None of these observations are new: They were all made about the HallRabushka, X Tax, and GIT cash flow tax proposals. 13 At the time, the US did not adopt these proposals, in part because of these objections. Why should we now continue down the same route, especially if there are better alternatives? 
